Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology
Volume 15

Issue 2

Article 7

2014

Selective Contracting in Prescription Drugs: The Benefits of
Pharmacy Networks
Joanna Shepherd

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst

Recommended Citation
Joanna Shepherd, Selective Contracting in Prescription Drugs: The Benefits of Pharmacy Networks, 15
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1027 (2014).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst/vol15/iss2/7

The Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology is published by the
University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing.

Selective Contracting in Prescription
Drugs: The Benefits of Pharmacy
Networks
Joanna Shepherd*
ABSTRACT
Selective contracting in health care involves contractual
arrangements among insurers and health care providers that
give covered individuals a financial incentive to obtain health
care from a limited panel of providers. Although selective
contracting has been an important strategy of health insurance
plans for decades, it has only recently expanded to prescription
drug coverage. Drug plans now create pharmacy networks that
channel customers to in-network pharmacies. Pharmacies
compete to be part of the networks by offering discounts on the
drugs they sell to covered customers and drug plans. Although
networks can lower prescription drug costs for drug plans and
consumers, opponents have argued that they also reduce access
to care because consumers can only visit certain providers. In
this Article, I use the principles of economic theory, the
conclusions of previous empirical studies, the determinations of
the FTC, and proprietary data I obtained from the largest
pharmacy benefit manager in the United States to analyze both
the claims in support of pharmacy networks and the arguments
against them. I find that pharmacy networks significantly lower
the cost of prescription drugs for drug plans and consumers.
Moreover, pharmacy networks have almost no effect on most
consumers’ access to pharmacies; the overwhelming majority of
consumers live near retail pharmacies that are included in
exclusive pharmacy networks.
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INTRODUCTION
Selective contracting in health care involves contractual
arrangements among insurers and health care providers that
give covered individuals a financial incentive to obtain health
care from a limited panel of providers.1 Although insurance
plans such as health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and
preferred provider organizations (PPOs) have engaged in
selective contracting for decades,2 only recently has the practice
expanded to prescription drug plans.3 The drug plans form
exclusive arrangements with retail pharmacies that promise to

1. Jill A. Marsteller et al., The Resurgence of Selective Contracting
Restrictions, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1133, 1134 (1997) (“The central
premise behind selective contracting is that managed care organizations
(MCOs) can provide high quality care at a lower cost than traditional
indemnity insurance plans by limiting the number and balancing the types of
providers that plan enrollees may visit.”).
2. Id. at 1136–37.
3. See, e.g., A Bill for an Act Relating to Prescription Drugs, Hearing on
H.B. No. 65 H.D. 1 Before the H. Comm. on Consumer Prot. & Commerce, 27th
Leg., 2013 Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2013) (statement of Gary M. Slovin et al.,
Walgreens) [hereinafter Statement of Slovin et al.], available at
http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2013/testimony/HB65_HD1_TESTIMON
Y_CPC-JUD_02-27-13_.PDF.
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steer insured individuals to in-network pharmacies.4 The
pharmacies, eager to be part of an exclusive network that will
offer significant sales, compete aggressively to be included in
the network by offering price discounts for filling
prescriptions.5 As a result, selective contracting can lower the
cost that both drug plans and consumers pay for prescription
drugs.6
Although pharmacy networks can reduce prescription drug
costs for drug plans and consumers, these savings come at the
expense of the retail pharmacies that must either offer price
discounts to be part of exclusive networks or lose sales by not
being included in the networks.7 As a result, pharmacy
representatives have alleged various harms created by
pharmacy networks.8 Some have argued that the networks
reduce consumers’ access to care by limiting their choice of
pharmacies.9 Others have suggested that smaller independent
pharmacies may be excluded from networks.10 Responding to
these arguments, many states and the federal government
have enacted regulations that limit the ability of health

4. See Michael G. Vita, Regulatory Restrictions on Selective Contracting:
An Empirical Analysis of “Any Willing Provider” Regulations, 20 J. HEALTH
ECON. 955, 955–56 (2001) (“[M]anaged care plans as conventionally defined
almost always provide enrollees with some financial incentive to obtain health
care services from a limited panel of providers.”).
5. Cf. Michael A. Morrisey, Competition in Hospital and Health
Insurance Markets: A Review and Research Agenda, 36 HEALTH SERVICES
RES. 191, 192 (2001) (“The general theory is that managed care introduces
price competition into health services markets. Such competition among
hospitals, physicians, and other providers results in lower prices, or at least
less rapidly increasing prices for services.”).
6. Id.
7. See Marsteller et al., supra note 1, at 1163.
8. Press Release, Nat’l Cmty. Pharmacists Ass’n, Community
Pharmacists Endorse Bipartisan Pharmacy Competition and Consumer
Choice Act (May 24, 2011) [hereinafter Nat’l Cmty. Pharmacists Ass’n],
available
at
http://www.ncpanet.org/index.php/news-releases/2011-newsreleases/994-community-pharmacists-endorse-bipartisan-pharmacycompetition-and-consumer-choice-act.
9. See, e.g., DAVID BALTO & JAMES KOVACS, NEW AM. FOUND.,
INCREASING COMPETITION AND CHOICE: AN EVALUATION OF PROPOSED
MEDICARE REGULATIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON PHARMACEUTICAL ACCESS
AND CARE 2 (2014), available at http://mipa.ms/wp-content/uploads/2014/
03/naf.Balto-Policy-Paper.pdf.
10. Id. at 3.
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insurers and/or prescription drug plans to contract
selectively.11
In this Article, I use the principles of economic theory, the
findings from previous empirical studies, the conclusions of the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and a proprietary dataset to
analyze both the claims in support of pharmacy networks and
the arguments against them. I obtained data from Express
Scripts Holding Company, the nation’s largest pharmacy
benefit manager (PBM)12 that manages over one billion
prescriptions each year for more than 100 million people.13 No
prior study has ever reported or analyzed this data or similar
data from another PBM to explore how pharmacy networks
work in practice.14
I find that exclusive pharmacy networks reduce the prices
for many drugs, leading to reductions in the overall spending
on pharmaceuticals. When drug plans have the ability to
exclude pharmacies from their network and steer patients
elsewhere, pharmacies compete aggressively for selective
contracts by offering price discounts for filling prescriptions.15
In general, more exclusive networks produce greater
competition because they promise to channel more patients to
network pharmacies.16 As a result, more exclusive networks
generate even steeper price discounts.17 Indeed, data from
Express Scripts confirm that clients that choose more exclusive
network options pay less for the prescription drug costs of their
covered individuals.18

11. Jonathan Klick & Joshua D. Wright, The Effect of Any Willing
Provider and Freedom of Choice Laws on Health Care Expenditures 5–8 (Univ.
of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. For Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 12-39, 2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2183279.
12. See, e.g., Reed Abelson & Natasha Singer, F.T.C. Approves Merger of 2
of the Biggest Pharmacy Benefit Managers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/business/ftc-approves-merger-of-expressscripts-and-medco.html.
13. See Corporate Profile, EXPRESS SCRIPTS, http://phx.corporateir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=69641&p=irol-homeprofile (last visited Mar. 1, 2014);
infra Part IV.
14. Based on the Author’s review of the literature and industry reports.
15. Klick & Wright, supra note 11, at 2.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Express Scripts, Standard Network Data (July 17, 2013) (unpublished
spreadsheet) (on file with author); infra Part IV.
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I also determine that concerns about consumers’ access to
care are largely unfounded. Competition among drug plans and
PBMs compels them to offer plan sponsors the amount of
accessibility that consumers prefer; drug plans and PBMs that
did not offer the desired level of accessibility would lose out in
the competitive market.19 Moreover, consumers do not appear
to value accessibility as much as they do lower prices; when
confronted with different plan options that vary in their degree
of provider choice and price, most consumers choose the options
that offer fewer provider choices and a lower price.20
Nevertheless, I conclude that pharmacy networks have almost
no effect on most consumers’ access to pharmacies. Express
Scripts’ data reveal that the overwhelming majority of
consumers live near retail pharmacies that are included in
exclusive pharmacy networks.21 In fact, the Express Scripts
networks far exceed pharmacy convenience of access standards
established by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS).22 Thus, well-designed pharmacy networks provide
customer convenience and lower the cost of healthcare.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the history
of selective contracting in both medical services and
prescription drug coverage. It also explains the three basic
forms of pharmacy networks: open networks, narrow networks,
and preferred networks. Part II discusses challenges to
selective contracting in prescription drug coverage. Most states
and the federal government have enacted various laws that
undermine pharmacy networks. Moreover, pharmacy groups
continue to pursue litigation that aims to restrict exclusive
pharmacy networks. In Part III, I analyze both the claims that
19. See Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Patrick C. Lynch, R.I.
Attorney Gen., and Juan M. Pichardo, Deputy Majority Leader, R.I. State
Senate 4–5 (Apr. 8, 2004) [hereinafter Letter from FTC to Lynch], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staffcomment-hon.patrick-c.lynch-and-hon.juan-m.pichardo-concerningcompetitive-effects-ri-general-assembly-bills-containing-pharmaceuticalfreedom/ribills.pdf.
20. See Nancy Dean Beaulieu, Quality Information and Consumer Health
Plan Choices, 21 J. HEALTH ECON. 43, 60 (2002) (“[F]amilies seem to value the
higher quality, lower price, smaller network combination offered by certain
HMOs . . . .”); Letter from FTC to Lynch, supra note 19, at 5 (“Many employers
offer a choice between higher cost, higher benefit plans, and lower cost, lower
benefit plans, and many employees choose the latter.”).
21. See infra Part IV.
22. See infra Part IV.
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selective contracting will generate cost savings for prescription
drugs and the arguments that exclusive networks reduce
consumers’ access to care. Part IV presents a case study from
Express Scripts Holding Company. I analyze Express Scripts’
data to describe various aspects of how pharmacy networks
work in practice: the exclusivity of the networks, the cost
savings generated by the networks, and consumers’ access to
care under the networks.
I.

HISTORY OF SELECTIVE CONTRACTING
IN HEALTH CARE

Since the advent of managed care in the 1980s, insurance
companies have engaged in selective contracting to lower the
price of health services.23 Health insurers created plans such as
HMOs and PPOs that formed exclusive arrangements with
health care providers that narrowed insured patients’ choices of
providers for covered services.24 This selective contracting
created intense competition among physicians, hospitals, and
other health care providers as they competed for insurers’
contracts.25 To secure these contracts and the increased
business they represented, providers offered health services at
discounted prices.26
The competition that results from selective contracting in
health insurance is exactly what economic theory would
predict.27 When insurers have the ability to exclude providers
from their network and steer patients elsewhere, providers
have significant incentives to compete aggressively for selective
contracts.28 Obtaining an exclusive agreement with an insurer
offers the possibility of significant customers and sales.29
Health care providers compete for exclusive agreements by
offering attractive services and lower prices.30 Indeed, a
23. See Morrisey, supra note 5, at 192.
24. See Glenn A. Melnick et al., The Effects of Market Structure and
Bargaining Position on Hospital Prices, 11 J. HEALTH ECON. 217, 217–18
(1992).
25. Morrisey, supra note 5, at 192.
26. Marsteller et al., supra note 1, at 1134.
27. Letter from FTC to Lynch, supra note 19, at 4.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Morrisey, supra note 5, at 192–93 (“The general theory is that
managed care introduces price competition into health services markets . . . .
These lower prices, by the mechanism of insurance market competition, are
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substantial body of empirical research has shown that selective
contracting by managed care plans such as HMOs and PPOs
has lowered the prices that both insurers and patients pay for
health care.31
Selective contracting has now extended from medical
services to prescription drug coverage.32 Just as physicians,
hospitals, and other health care providers have competed to be
part of exclusive networks of covered providers for over thirty
years,33 pharmacies now compete to be included in exclusive
networks of pharmacies.34 The justification of pharmacy
networks is identical to the economic theory behind provider
networks: exclusive arrangements between prescription drug
plans and retail pharmacies promise to steer insured
individuals to in-network pharmacies.35 The pharmacies, eager
to be part of an exclusive network that will offer significant
sales, compete aggressively to be included in the network by
offering price discounts for filling prescriptions.36
In practice, much of the negotiation with retail pharmacies
about network inclusion and price discounts is handled by
PBMs.37 PBMs contract with health plan sponsors to manage
the prescription drug benefits of their members.38 To reduce
prescription drug costs, PBMs assemble networks of retail
pharmacies where the individuals covered by the prescription
drug plan can fill prescriptions.39 The drug plans offer covered
individuals significant financial incentives to fill prescriptions

passed on to purchasers in the form of lower health insurance premiums . . . .
Arguably, decisions as to who gets contracts now depend on services . . . and
price.”); Letter from FTC to Lynch, supra note 19, at 4.
31. Morrisey, supra note 5, at 192.
32. See Klick & Wright, supra note 11, at 2.
33. See supra notes 23–31 and accompanying text.
34. Klick & Wright, supra note 11, at 2.
35. See id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., id. (“PBMs facilitate agreements among pharmaceutical
manufacturers, retail pharmacies, and health plan sponsors. They engage in
selective contracting to create networks of these providers, which in turn
participate in specified plans to distribute health care services and
pharmaceutical drugs to patients who subscribe to the plans.” (citation
omitted)).
39. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS: OWNERSHIP OF
MAIL-ORDER PHARMACIES 1 (2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/
pharmbenefit05/050906pharmbenefitrpt.pdf.
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at the network pharmacies; plans generally will not cover
prescriptions filled at out-of-network pharmacies, and
consumers often pay lower co-pays at preferred network
pharmacies.40 And, because inclusion in a network generally
leads to significant revenues for the pharmacies, pharmacies
compete to be included in a PBM’s network by offering
discounts to the PBM.41 Pursuant to contracts negotiated with
plan sponsors, PBMs pass on these savings to reduce health
plan costs and drug prices for consumers.42 Confirming the
lower prices, an extensive FTC study of the PBM industry
found that consumers covered by a PBM-administered drug
plan pay significantly less for both brand name and generic
drugs than do consumers without prescription drug
insurance.43
The attractiveness of any network to a provider—either
heath care provider or pharmacy—depends critically on its
exclusivity.44 The fewer competitors that are included in the
network, the more customers and sales a particular provider or
pharmacy can expect to receive.45 In contrast, individual
providers or pharmacies would have no reason to bid
aggressively to be part of a network that included all of the
competitors in an area; customers would continue to visit their
usual provider or pharmacy because their insurance plan
would not give them any incentive to visit a different one.46
PBMs and drug plans typically have a variety of networks that
differ in their degree of exclusivity and, in turn, the prices that
consumers and health plans pay for pharmaceuticals.47

40. See id. at 9.
41. Id. at 3–4.
42. See id. at 8–9; Letter from FTC to Lynch, supra note 19, at 4.
43. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 39, at 36.
44. See id. at 5.
45. Id. (“Retail pharmacies generally will offer higher discounts to be in a
more exclusive network, because each retail pharmacy will fill a larger
percentage of prescriptions if fewer retail pharmacies are in the PBM’s
network.”).
46. See Christine Piette Durrance, The Impact of Pharmacy-Specific AnyWilling-Provider Legislation on Prescription Drug Expenditures, 37 ATLANTIC
ECON. J. 409, 410–11 (2009).
47. See Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Terry G. Kilgore, Member,
Commonwealth of Va. House of Delegates 5 (Oct. 2, 2006) [hereinafter Letter
from FTC to Kilgore], available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-hon.terry-g.kilgore-
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These pharmacy networks take three basic forms: (1) open
networks; (2) preferred networks; and (3) narrow or “limited”
networks.48 Many pharmacy networks are “open networks” that
are open to any pharmacy that agrees to offer basic discounts to
the prescription drug plan and its members.49 In addition,
many plans create a “preferred network” within the broader
open network.50 To be part of the preferred network,
pharmacies offer steeper discounts than the non-preferred
pharmacies in the open network.51 Prescription drug plans, in
turn, steer their members to the preferred pharmacies through
lower co-pays and cost-sharing.52 Finally, some pharmacy
networks are “narrow” or “limited” networks.53 In contrast to a
preferred network, which is a subset within a broader open
network, a narrow network is a stand-alone network of a
limited number of pharmacies.54 Prescription drug plans will
generally not cover prescriptions filled outside of the narrow
network.55 As a result, pharmacies offer significant discounts to
be part of narrow networks that require customers to fill
prescriptions at in-network pharmacies.56 Thus, while
pharmacies may offer discounts to be part of any pharmacy
network, in general, the more exclusive the network, the larger
the cost savings for both drug plans and consumers.57
II. CHALLENGES FOR PHARMACY NETWORKS
Exclusive pharmacy networks have generally been popular
among drug plans and consumers, but controversial among
concerning-virginia-house-bill-no.945-regulate-contractual-relationshipbetween-pharmacy-benefit-managers-and-both-health-benefit/v060018.pdf.
48. Visante, How Pharmacy Networks Could Save Medicare, Medicaid,
and Commercial Payers $115 Billion, RXOBSERVER.COM, 4 (Jan. 2013),
http://www.rxobserver.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/visante-pcmapharmacy-networks-study-1-24-13.pdf.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.; see also Adam Fein, Walmart’s Booming Preferred Network
Models, DRUG CHANNELS (Aug. 25, 2011), http://www.drugchannels.net/2011/
08/walmarts-booming-preferred-network.html (“The consumer can choose any
pharmacy, but pays a lower price at a Walmart pharmacy.”).
52. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
53. Visante, supra note 48, at 4.
54. Id.
55. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 39, at 9.
56. Id. at 4–5.
57. See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.
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retail pharmacies.58 The networks lower prescription drug costs
for drug plans and consumers, but these savings come at the
expense of the retail pharmacies that must either offer price
discounts to be part of exclusive networks or lose sales by not
being included in the networks.59 As a result, pharmacy
representatives have alleged various harms created by network
pharmacies.60 Some pharmacy representatives have argued
that the networks limit consumers’ access to their choice of
pharmacies.61 Others have suggested that smaller and
independent pharmacies may be the pharmacies excluded from
networks.62 Consequently, many pharmacy groups have
supported legislative efforts and pursued litigation to
undermine pharmacy networks.63 In this Part, I discuss state
and federal legislation and representative legal cases that aim
to restrict exclusive pharmacy networks.
A. LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS
In response to arguments from health providers and retail
pharmacy representatives, many states have enacted
regulations that limit the ability of health insurers and/or
prescription drug plans to contract selectively.64 These laws fall
into two related categories.65 “Any-willing-provider” (AWP)
laws require plans to accept into their network any provider (or
pharmacy) that is willing to accept the plan’s terms and
conditions.66 For example, if a pharmacy agrees to the terms a
prescription drug plan pays the pharmacies in its network, the
plan must accept the pharmacy and pay it the same rate it
pays the other network pharmacies. “Freedom-of-choice” (FOC)

58. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 39, at 5 (discussing how
pharmacies have to offer discounts in order to be part of exclusive networks);
supra note 47 and accompanying text.
59. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 39, at 5.
60. Nat’l Cmty. Pharmacists Ass’n, supra note 8.
61. BALTO & KOVACS, supra note 9, at 1–2; Nat’l Cmty. Pharmacists
Ass’n, supra note 8.
62. Nat’l Cmty. Pharmacists Ass’n, supra note 8.
63. See, e.g., Statement of Slovin et al., supra note 3; BALTO & KOVACS,
supra note 9, at 1–2; Nat’l Cmty. Pharmacists Ass’n, supra note 8.
64. Marsteller et al., supra note 1, at 1134–35.
65. Vita, supra note 4, at 956.
66. Id. (“‘[A]ny-willing-provider’ (AWP) laws . . . compel managed care
plans to accept into their networks any qualified provider who is willing to
accept the plan’s terms and conditions . . . .”).
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laws compel plans to reimburse providers (or pharmacies) for
any service they provide, even if they are not in the plan’s
network.67 Thus, under an FOC law, if a covered individual fills
a prescription at a non-network pharmacy, the plan must pay
the pharmacy the same rate that it would pay its network
pharmacies. To the extent that the non-network pharmacy
charges more than network pharmacies, the individual
consumer must pay the difference.68 States have enacted AWP
and FOC laws for decades, and most states now have some
version of the laws in their insurance codes.69
The purpose of AWP and FOC laws is to force both health
insurers and prescription drug plans to do business with all
providers.70 Although large pharmacy chains have sometimes
lobbied for AWP and FOC laws to guarantee that they are not
excluded from any pharmacy network,71 most of the support for
the laws has come from independent and community
pharmacies.72 Proponents of the laws argue that managed care
plans and PBMs force many independent community providers
out of the market because they only allow larger providers and
pharmacy chains into their networks.73 They assert that
excluding these smaller providers will reduce the quality of
health care because smaller community providers deliver more
personal comprehensive care.74 Proponents also argue that
excluding providers from exclusive networks will increase drug
prices as competition is reduced in the prescription drug
market.75

67. Id.
68. Klick & Wright, supra note 11, at 5.
69. Marsteller et al., supra note 1, at 1136.
70. Klick & Wright, supra note 11, at 5.
71. See Statement of Slovin et al., supra note 3.
72. See, e.g., Adam J. Fein, New York’s Anti-Mail Bill and the Coming
CHANNELS
(Dec.
14,
2011),
Generic
Price
War,
DRUG
http://www.drugchannels.net/2011/12/new-yorks-anti-mail-bill-andcoming.html; Devon M. Herrick, Reforming Arkansas’ Medicaid Drug
Program, NAT’L CENTER FOR POL’Y ANALYSIS (Feb. 19, 2014),
http://www.ncpa.org/pub/ib137; Nat’l Cmty. Pharmacists Ass’n, supra note 8.
73. Nat’l Cmty. Pharmacists Ass’n, supra note 8.
74. Cathy McMorris Rodgers & Anthony Weiner, McMorris Rodgers and
Weiner: Local Pharmacies Play Essential Role in Care, ROLL CALL (June 6,
2011, 12:00 AM), www.rollcall.com/issues/56_133/local_pharmacies_play_
essential_role_care-206186-1.html.
75. See BALTO & KOVACS, supra note 9, at 2–3.
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AWP and FOC laws take various forms in different
states.76 Some laws only apply to specific providers, such as
pharmacists or optometrists, while other states’ laws apply to
all health care providers.77 Similarly, whereas many laws cover
arrangements made by any health or drug plan, other states’
laws cover only networks of health care providers formed by
HMOs or PPOs or networks of pharmacies developed by
PBMs.78
Federal policymakers, to a limited extent, have also been
persuaded by the arguments against selective contracting.
Congress included an AWP provision in Medicare Part D that
requires Part D drug plans to permit the participation of any
pharmacy that meets the terms of the plan.79 Recently, “The
Pharmacy Competition and Consumer Choice Act of 2011”
proposed similar legislation on the national level.80 Although
never enacted, the bill would have put in place a federal AWP
law that would prohibit plans from “exclud[ing] an otherwise
qualified pharmacist or pharmacy from participation in a
particular network provided that the pharmacist or
pharmacy . . . accepts the terms, conditions and reimbursement
rates . . . .”81
B. LITIGATION
Independent pharmacies have also filed numerous lawsuits
to undermine the use of preferred and narrow networks. The
claims generally name as defendant a state health department,
a federal agency, or a drug plan that has established a
pharmacy network.
Many pharmacy associations and independent pharmacies
have brought cases against state health departments, arguing
that independent pharmacies have been excluded from the

76.
77.
78.
79.

Marsteller et al., supra note 1, at 1134.
Klick & Wright, supra note 11, at 6.
Id. at 6–7.
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., PRESCRIPTION DRUG
BENEFIT MANUAL CHAPTER 5: BENEFITS AND BENEFICIARY PROTECTIONS
50.8.1 (Sept. 20, 2011), available at http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/PrescriptionDrug-Coverage/PrescriptionDrugCovContra/Downloads/MemoPDBManual
Chapter5_093011.pdf.
80. Nat’l Cmty. Pharmacists Ass’n, supra note 8.
81. H.R. 1971, 112th Cong. (2011); accord. S. 1058, 112th Cong. (2011).
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network of pharmacies serving Medicaid patients.82 For
example, the Florida Pharmacy Association and several
independent Florida pharmacies have filed a lawsuit against
the state’s Agency for Health Care Administration to force the
state to include independent Florida pharmacies in the
network of qualified Medicaid pharmacies.83 The claim argues
that the Agency has entered into contracts with HMOs and
other organizations that exclude independent and community
Florida pharmacies from their Medicaid networks.84 The
plaintiffs allege that, as a result, Medicaid patients can only fill
prescriptions at pharmacies in the network that includes only
CVS, Wal-Mart, and a select number of other pharmacies that
are affiliated with other managed care organizations.85 The
plaintiffs argue that exclusion of independent pharmacies from
the Florida Medicaid State Health Plan is in violation of
federal and state FOC requirements.86
Other lawsuits have been aimed at the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) and the CMS challenging
the lawfulness of the establishment under Medicare Part D of
preferred pharmacy networks.87 For example, Southwest
Pharmacy Solutions, an organization representing more than
500 pharmacies in eight states, recently filed a claim arguing
that the CMS wrongfully allowed insurers offering Part D
plans to form preferred networks of pharmacies.88 The
plaintiffs argued that the preferred networks exclude

82. See, e.g., Complaint at 2, Fla. Pharmacy Ass’n v. State of Fla., Agency
for Health Care Admin., No. 2012-CA-002355 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 26, 2012),
available
at
http://miamiherald.typepad.com/files/fpa-press-releaselawsuit.pdf.
83. Id. at 1–2.
84. See id. at 2, 12–14.
85. Id. at 14, exhibit E.
86. Id. at 16–20.
87. See Sw. Pharmacy Solutions, Inc. v. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid
Servs., 718 F.3d 436, 439 (5th Cir. 2013).
88. Carolina Bolado, Medicare, Medicaid Sued over Preferred Pharmacy
Rule, LAW360 (July 11, 2011, 5:21 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/
257026/medicare-medicaid-sued-over-preferred-pharmacy-rule;
see
also
Farmville Disc. Drug, Inc. v. Sebelius, 4:12-CV-109-D, 2013 WL 1246815, at *1
(E.D.N.C. Mar. 27, 2013) (discussing how independent pharmacies sued the
HHS and the CMS arguing that the Preferred Pharmacy Rule violated the
AWP rule).
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independent pharmacies, in violation of the Medicare Part D
AWP provision.89
Other suits involve claims between independent
pharmacies and insurers that utilize preferred pharmacy
networks.90 For example, specialty pharmacy MedfusionRx
recently filed suit against insurer Aetna Inc., claiming the
insurer excluded the pharmacy from its retail pharmacy
network.91 MedfusionRx alleged that Aetna removed the
pharmacy from its retail network and instead moved it to a
different network with higher fees and lower reimbursement
rates.92 The pharmacy claimed that because of this change,
many of its former customers were no longer allowed to fill
prescriptions at the pharmacy.93 MedfusionRx argued that
excluding the pharmacy from the retail network is in violation
of Mississippi AWP laws.94
These and many other claims have had varying
outcomes.95 Thus despite the widespread use of selective
contracting in health care, the threat of litigation remains a
challenge for drug plans utilizing preferred and narrow
pharmacy networks.
III. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF SELECTIVE
CONTRACTING IN PHARMACY NETWORKS
Exclusive pharmacy networks are premised on the idea
that selective contracting will generate cost savings for
consumers and drug plans.96 However, opponents argue that
exclusive networks reduce consumers’ access to care because

89. Sw. Pharmacy Solutions, Inc., 718 F.3d at 439.
90. See MedfusionRx LLC v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 3:12CV00567, 2012
WL 3619616, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 8, 2012).
91. Id.; see also Carolina Bolado, Aetna Hit with Suit over New Specialty
Pharmacy Network, LAW360 (Aug. 9, 2012, 6:15 PM), http://www.law360.com/
articles/368492/aetna-hit-with-suit-over-new-specialty-pharmacy-network
(discussing the MedfusionRx lawsuit).
92. MedfusionRx LLC, 2012 WL 3619616, at *1.
93. Bolado, supra note 91.
94. Id.
95. See Any Willing Provider Cases, Complaints and Legal Resources,
INDEP. SPECIALTY PHARMACY COALITION, http://www.ispcoalition.org/awpcases.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2014).
96. See supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text.

2014]

BENEFITS OF PHARMACY NETWORKS

1041

consumers can only visit certain providers.97 In this Part, I use
the principles of economic theory, the findings from previous
empirical studies, and the conclusions of the FTC to analyze
both the claims in support of pharmacy networks and the
arguments against them.
A. THE EFFECT OF PHARMACY NETWORKS ON DRUG SPENDING
Basic economic theory predicts the effect that selective
contracting in pharmaceutical markets will have on drug prices
and overall drug spending.98 Pharmacies will compete to be
part of exclusive networks that will channel customers to
network pharmacies.99 The more customer traffic directed
towards pharmacies (which depends on both the number of
covered customers and the exclusivity of the network), the
more intensely pharmacies will compete to be part of the
network.100 Pharmacies compete by offering discounts and
other price concessions on the drugs they sell to covered
customers and drug plans.101 Thus, economic theory predicts
that exclusive pharmacy networks will lower the prices that
consumers and plans pay for pharmaceuticals.
The basic premise behind selective contracting in
pharmaceutical markets can be seen in countless other
markets. Consider the market for hotel rooms: the quoted rate
for a customer booking one room is typically significantly
higher than the rate quoted to a company or association that is
booking a block of 300 rooms for an upcoming event.102 The

97. See BALTO & KOVACS, supra note 9, at 1–3; cf. Letter from David A.
Balto, Attorney at Law, to Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor, New York 3–4 (Oct.
17, 2011) [hereinafter Letter from Balto to Cuomo], available at
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:Sah4EJsVyKcJ:www.t
ruthrx.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/NY-AMMO-Letter-Cuomo.pdf+&cd=
1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us (discussing how selective contracting is not
beneficial to consumers because consumers value choice).
98. See Letter from FTC to Lynch, supra note 19, at 4 (“An abundance of
empirical evidence now exists demonstrating that, other things equal,
selective contracting increases the intensity of competition among providers,
which is manifested in lower prices paid by insurers to providers . . . . These
findings conform to economic theory.”).
99. See supra Part I.
100. See supra Part I.
101. See supra Part I.
102. See generally, Woo Gon Kim & Stephen J. Hiemstra, Economic Hotel
Room Pricing: A Multi-Stage Synthetic Approach, in PROCEEDINGS OF 2003
INTERNATIONAL CHRIE CONFERENCE 216 (Hailin Qu ed., 2003), available at
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obvious reason for this price difference is that the hotel is
willing to offer a price discount in order to secure 300
reservations from the company or association members.
Network pharmacies are no different than hotels in this
example; pharmacies are willing to offer price discounts to
secure customers covered by the drug plan.103
The FTC has repeatedly reinforced the economic theory
behind pharmacy networks:
When insurers have a credible threat to exclude providers from
their networks and channel patients elsewhere, providers have a
powerful incentive to bid aggressively. Inclusion in a restricted
panel offers the provider the prospect of substantially increased
sales opportunities. Without such credible threats, however,
providers have less incentive to bid aggressively, and even
managed care organizations with large market shares may have
less ability to obtain low prices.104

The FTC has also explained how more exclusive networks
generate even steeper price discounts.105 It has determined that
health care providers compete more intensely to be part of a
more restricted network: “HMOs, which have more limited
panels than PPOs, induce more intense price competition
among providers than would PPOs of equivalent size.”106
Similarly, the FTC has concluded that more restrictive
pharmacy networks generate more intense competition: “The
more exclusive the network, the larger the discount retail
pharmacies will offer, believing that greater exclusivity is
likely to bring them more customers.”107 Network exclusivity
“ensure[s] that the network can direct a sufficient patient
volume to its providers to justify price concessions.”108
Moreover, the FTC has indicated that AWP and FOC laws
restricting selective contracting hurt consumers by raising the
prices of pharmaceuticals:

http://m3.ithq.qc.ca/collection/00000144.pdf (discussing the rates of hotel
rooms).
103. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
104. Letter from FTC to Lynch, supra note 19, at 4.
105. See id.
106. Id.
107. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH
CARE: A DOSE OF COMPETITION ch. 7, at 14 (2004), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare/040723healthcarerpt.pdf.
108. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, STATEMENTS OF
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE 122 (1996).
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FTC staff have expressed concerns about potential anticompetitive
effects and consumer harms associated with AWP and FOC laws
before. These laws can make it more difficult for health insurers or
PBMs to negotiate discounts from providers; if plans cannot give
providers any assurance of favorable treatment or greater volume
in exchange for lower prices, then the incentive for providers to bid
aggressively for the plan’s business—to offer better rates—is
undercut. AWP and FOC laws also can limit competition by
restricting the ability of insurance companies to offer consumers
different plans, with varying levels of choice. These restrictions on
competition may result in insurance companies paying higher fees
to providers, which, in turn, generally results in higher premiums,
and may increase the number of people without coverage.109

Numerous empirical studies confirm that selective
contracting reduces the price of health care services.110 Many
studies have investigated the impact of selective contracting by
managed care plans on the prices of health care services.111 In
what is often regarded as one of the strongest studies of
selective contracting by managed care plans, Melnick et al.
examined the hospital transaction prices negotiated by a large
California PPO.112 They found that the PPO was able to
negotiate lower prices for health care services by channeling
more patients to the network hospital; the larger the share of
the hospital’s business accounted for by the PPO, the greater
the leverage the PPO had with the hospital.113 The researchers
also found that the PPO was able to negotiate lower prices for
health services when there were more hospital competitors; in
markets with more hospital competitors, the PPO is able to
make a credible threat to channel its covered patients to
another hospital.114 Thus, selective contracting by managed

109. Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n, to James L. Seward, Senator, New
York Senate 3 (Mar. 31, 2009) (citations omitted), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staffcomment-honorable-james-l.seward-concerning-new-york-senate-bill-58pharmacy-benefit-managers-pbms/v090006newyorkpbm.pdf.
110. See, e.g., Morrisey, supra note 5, at 195–97.
111. See, e.g., id. at 191; cf. Vita, supra note 4, at 955–56 (finding that per
capita health spending increased in states that passed stringent AWP or FOC
laws); Klick & Wright, supra note 11, at 4 (describing studies finding that
AWP and FOC laws lead to increased health care expenditures).
112. See Melnick et al., supra note 24, at 217 (examining the “prices
obtained in different types of markets by the largest PPO in California”).
113. Id. at 229–30.
114. Id.
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care plans results in lower prices as providers bid aggressively
to be part of an exclusive network.115
Other studies have examined the impact of selective
contracting in pharmacy networks on drug prices.116 A recent
empirical study by health care consulting firm Visante found
that preferred and narrow networks lower prescription costs for
consumers because pharmacies will offer discounts to be in the
more exclusive networks.117 Specifically, it found evidence that
preferred networks lower prescription costs by an estimated 5%
compared to open networks.118 Additionally, it found that
pharmacies will offer the steepest discounts to be part of the
most exclusive narrow networks.119 Compared to open
networks, narrow networks can lower prescription costs by an
estimated 10%.120
Another recent analysis by the CMS examined Medicare
Part D Prescription Drug Plans that have a preferred
pharmacy network.121 The CMS found that prescription drug
costs were approximately 6% lower at preferred pharmacies
compared to non-preferred pharmacies.122 Moreover, the more
potential customers the plans can channel to the preferred
pharmacies, the greater the savings.123 For the four largest
Part D drug plans, preferred pharmacies offered prescription
drug prices that were about 8% less than the prices offered by
non-preferred pharmacies.124

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See id.
Visante, supra note 48, at 6–10.
See id. at 10.
Id. at 14, 21.
See id. at 9–10.
Id. at 14.
See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., PART D CLAIMS
ANALYSIS: NEGOTIATED PRICING BETWEEN PREFERRED AND NON-PREFERRED
PHARMACY NETWORKS (2013), available at https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/
Prescription-Drug-Coverage/PrescriptionDrugCovGenIn/Downloads/
PharmacyNetwork.pdf; see also Adam Fein, New CMS Study: Preferred
Pharmacy Networks Are Cheaper (Except When They’re Not), DRUG CHANNELS
(July
11,
2013),
http://www.drugchannels.net/2013/07/new-cms-studypreferred-pharmacy_11.html (discussing the CMS study about “preferred
pharmacy networks in Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Plans (PDPs)”).
122. See Fein, supra note 121.
123. See id.
124. See id. (“The four biggest plans, accounting for 93% of claims, had
average savings of 8% at preferred pharmacies.”).
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Other studies have empirically tested the impact of AWP
or FOC laws that limit selective contracting on healthcare and
pharmaceutical spending.125 One study found an increase in
overall healthcare spending in states that passed stringent
AWP laws.126 Another study examining pharmacy-specific AWP
laws found increased pharmaceutical spending in states that
passed AWP laws that limited exclusive pharmacy networks.127
In a recent study of the impact of AWP and FOC laws on health
care spending, Professors Klick and Wright found that these
laws are associated with an overall increase in health care
spending of at least 3%.128 Moreover, they found that AWP and
FOC laws increase pharmaceutical drug spending by 5.8%.129
Thus, the empirical findings support the economic theory
behind selective contracting in pharmaceutical markets.130 As
pharmacies compete to be part of exclusive pharmacy
networks, they reduce prices for many drugs, which reduces
spending costs associated with pharmaceuticals.131 Laws that
limit exclusive networks restrict the ability of PBMs and drug
plans to negotiate discounts with pharmacies.132 These laws
lead to increases in spending on pharmaceuticals.133
B. THE EFFECT OF PHARMACY NETWORKS ON CUSTOMER
ACCESS
Opponents of pharmacy networks also allege that selective
contracting reduces consumers’ access to care because
consumers can only visit specific network pharmacies.134 They
argue that PBMs or drug plans that severely limit the number
of pharmacies in their network may impose a cost on
consumers that have to travel significant distances to reach a

125. See Vita, supra note 4, at 955.
126. Id.
127. See Durrance, supra note 46, at 409.
128. Klick & Wright, supra note 11, at 11.
129. Id. at 13.
130. For a discussion of the economic theory behind selective contracting,
see supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text.
131. E.g., Letter from FTC to Lynch, supra note 19, at 4.
132. See id. at 1.
133. Id. at 6.
134. Cf. Letter from Balto to Cuomo, supra note 97, at 3 (“Consumers want
choice and availability of numerous alternative pharmacies.”).
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network pharmacy.135 However, there are several reasons to
believe that exclusive pharmacy networks do not create access
to care problems.136 First, drug plans and PBMs compete
intensely for contracts with health plan sponsors and
consumers.137 A drug plan or PBM that did not offer the
accessibility that consumers wanted in their pharmacy network
would lose business to other competitors that provided more
accessibility.138 Thus, competition among drug plans and PBMs
compels them to offer the amount of accessibility that
consumers prefer.139
The FTC has determined that competitive forces ensure
that restricted networks will not significantly limit consumers’
access to pharmacies:
Limitations on choice are unlikely to be so severe that consumers’
access to pharmacy services is inadequate. Just as competitive
forces encourage pharmacies to offer their best price and service
combination to a payer to gain access to its subscribers,
competition also encourages payers (and employers) to establish
pharmacy service arrangements that offer the level of accessibility
that subscribers prefer.140

Indeed, empirical evidence confirms that competitive networks
offer many choices and do not restrict consumers’ access to
pharmacies. In its own empirical examination, the FTC
concluded that “[m]ost PBMs contract with 90 percent of the
retail pharmacies,” and nearly all of the retail chain
pharmacies in the regions that they serve.141 In fact, in the
next section I show that the largest PBM includes over 93% of
retail pharmacies in its network.142 Moreover, evidence
suggests that consumers do not value accessibility as much as

135. Morrisey, supra note 5, at 201 (“If managed care means selective
contracting . . . the implication is that subscribers may be traveling further for
care as managed care plans range further afield seeking lower prices.”).
136. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, In the Matter of Caremark Rx,
Inc./AdvancePCS (Feb. 11, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/cases/2004/02/040211ftcstatement0310239.pdf.
137. See FED. TRADE COMM’N., supra, note 107, ch. 7, at 15.
138. See Letter from FTC to Lynch, supra note 19, at 5 (discussing how
different customers will want different things and how “competition also
encourages payers . . . to establish pharmacy service arrangements that offer
the level of accessibility that subscribers prefer”).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 107, ch. 7, at 12.
142. See infra Part IV.
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they do lower prices.143 PBMs and drug plans typically offer
different networks of pharmacies that vary in their degree of
exclusivity and, in turn, the prices that consumers pay for
Consumers
that
value
expanded
pharmaceuticals.144
accessibility and choice of pharmacy can choose broader
networks, while consumers that prioritize lower drug prices
over expansive accessibility can choose narrow or preferred
networks.145 Empirical evidence shows that, when confronted
with different plan options that vary in their degree of provider
choice and price, most consumers choose the options that offer
fewer provider choices but at a lower price.146
The FTC has reiterated that many consumers prefer lower
prices over increased accessibility:
Not all consumers . . . will necessarily desire such broad access if
this expanded access is costly. Many employers offer a choice
between higher cost, higher benefit plans, and lower cost, lower
benefit plans, and many employees choose the latter. Consumer
preference for such programs presumably means that, in at least
some consumers’ view, the advantages of lower premiums and/or
lower out-of-pocket costs outweigh the disadvantages of limiting
the choice of provider.147

Thus, competition among drug plans and PBMs compels them
to offer the amount of accessibility that consumers prefer; drug
plans and PBMs that did not offer the desired level of
accessibility would lose out in the competitive market.148
Indeed, empirical evidence indicates that pharmacy networks
have almost no effect on most consumers’ access to pharmacies;
the overwhelming majority of consumers live near retail
pharmacies that are included in exclusive pharmacy
networks.149 Moreover, most consumers prefer more exclusive

143. Anna Wilde Mathews, Price, Price, Price: Health-Insurance Shoppers
Have Priorities, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424127887323300004578555560447477062.html.
144. See Letter from FTC to Kilgore, supra note 47, at 5–6.
145. See, e.g., Visante, supra note 48, at 4.
146. See, e.g., Beaulieu, supra note 20, at 60; Dennis P. Scanlon et al., The
Impact of Health Plan Report Cards on Managed Care Enrollment, 21 J.
HEALTH ECON. 19, 36 (2002); Mathews, supra note 143.
147. Letter from FTC to Lynch, supra note 19, at 5 (citation omitted).
148. See id.
149. See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
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networks that restrict access to some pharmacies but provide
pharmaceuticals at lower prices.150
IV. CASE STUDY: PHARMACY NETWORKS
OF EXPRESS SCRIPTS
To confirm the predictions of economic theory, the
conclusions of previous empirical studies, and the assertions of
the FTC, I obtained proprietary data from Express Scripts,151
the largest PBM in the United States.152 No prior study has
ever reported or analyzed this data or similar data from
another PBM to explore how pharmacy networks work in
practice.153 In this section, I explain what the data reveals
about the exclusivity of pharmacy networks, the cost savings
generated by the networks, and consumers’ access to care
under the networks.
Express Scripts manages more than one billion
prescriptions each year for more than one hundred million
people.154 The company’s clients include “managed care
organizations, health insurers, third-party administrators,
employers,
union-sponsored
benefit
plans,
workers’
compensation plans and government health programs.”155
Express Scripts acts as an intermediary between its clients,
covered individuals, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and retail
pharmacies.156 Like other PBMs, Express Scripts incorporates
several practices that reduce the costs associated with
prescription drug spending: establishing networks of local
pharmacies where members can obtain medication based on
their pharmacy benefit design; developing drug formularies
150. See Mathews, supra note 143 (“[T]he focus on price . . . is a constant.
Consulting firm Booz & Co.’s pretend exchanges showed that premiums were
the most important factor in plan selection . . . .”).
151. See Express Scripts, supra note 18.
152. Top 10 Pharmacy Benefit Management Companies and Market Share
by Membership, as of 2nd Quarter 2011, PHARMACY BENEFIT MGMT. INST.,
https://www.pbmi.com/PBMmarketshare1.asp (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
153. Based on the Author’s review of the literature and industry reports.
154. The Atlantic’s Take on Our Fight to End Rx Abuse, EXPRESS SCRIPTS,
http://lab.express-scripts.com/pharmacy-waste/the-atlantics-take-on-our-fightto-end-rx-abuse/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2014).
155. EXPRESS SCRIPTS HOLDING CO., FORM 10-K ANNUAL REPORT 57
(2013) [hereinafter FORM 10-K]; available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/1532063/000119312513063930/d450292d10k.htm.
156. See About Us, EXPRESS SCRIPTS, http://www.express-scripts.com/
aboutus/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2014).
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and negotiating discounts and rebates from drug
manufacturers; providing access to mail order pharmacies;157
evaluating prescribing patterns to ensure consumers obtain
appropriate drugs for the lowest price;158 and processing claims
for their health plan sponsor clients.159
Express Scripts has provided data about the pharmacy
networks it has developed for its clients. Express Scripts
provided only aggregate data about the percentage of
pharmacies included in the different networks, the proximity of
network pharmacies to covered individuals, and cost savings
among the different networks.160 The data included no
identifying variables because of the confidential nature of
individual client contracts.161 The Express Scripts data is
current as of July 17, 2013.162
Express Scripts offers various network options to its
clients.163 Although some clients require a customized network
to meet their specific needs and population of covered
individuals, many clients choose from Express Scripts’
standard network options.164 The options vary in how many
pharmacies are included in a network, and in turn, in the cost
savings they generate for clients.165 There are approximately
70,000 retail pharmacies in the United States.166 Express
Scripts’ broad network option includes over 93% of all retail
pharmacies, while their standard narrow network option
includes approximately 81% of all retail pharmacies in the
network.167 Table 1 reports the percentage of pharmacies
157. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 39, at i.
158. E.g., id. at 7–10.
159. E.g., id. at 2 n.3.
160. Express Scripts, supra note 18.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See Services, EXPRESS SCRIPTS, http://www.express-scripts.com/
services/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2014).
164. See FORM 10-K, supra note 155, at 6; Express Scripts, supra note 18.
This observation is also based on the Author’s discussion with representatives
of Express Scripts.
165. See Services, supra note 163; Express Scripts, supra note 18.
166. See Michael Taitel et al., Pharmacists as Immunization Providers:
Patient Attitudes and Perceptions, PHARMACY TIMES (Sept. 16, 2011),
http://www.pharmacytimes.com/publications/issue/2011/September2011/Phar
macists-as-Immunization-Providers-Patient-Attitudes-and-Perceptions.
167. Express Scripts, supra note 18. The primary difference between the
two network options is that the standard narrow network excludes one large
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included in Express Scripts’ standard networks in urban areas,
suburban areas, and rural areas.168
Table 1: Percentage of Pharmacies Included in Express
Scripts’ Standard Network Options
% of Total
Urban
Pharmacies

% of Total
Suburban
Pharmacies

% of Total
Rural
Pharmacies

Standard Broad
Network

92.1%

94.1%

94.9%

Standard Narrow
Network169

77.1%

78.5%

85.0%

As basic economic theory would predict, Express Scripts
generates greater savings for clients who choose more exclusive
network options. Pharmacies compete to be part of Express
Scripts’ exclusive networks by offering discounts and other
price concessions for prescription drugs.170 As a result, Express
national retail chain pharmacy. Id. When this large chain is disregarded, the
narrow network still includes 92% of all other retail pharmacies in the
network. Id.
168. Id.
169. If the large national chain is disregarded, the percentage of
pharmacies included in Express Scripts’ standard narrow network rises
substantially, as illustrated by the table below. Id.

Standard Narrow
Network (excluding a
national chain not
included in the
Narrow Network)

% of Total
Urban
Pharmacies

% of Total
Suburban
Pharmacies

% of Total
Rural
Pharmacies

90.3%

92.6%

94.0%

170. Id.; see EXPRESS SCRIPTS, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 13 (2013), available
at
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=69641&p=irol-reportsAnnual
(“We believe the primary competitive factors in the industry include the
ability to contract with retail pharmacies to ensure our retail pharmacy
networks meet the needs of our clients and their members, the ability to
negotiate discounts on prescription drugs with drug manufacturers, the ability
to navigate the complexities of governmental reimbursed business, including
Medicare Part D, Medicaid and the Public Exchanges, the ability to manage
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Scripts’ clients who use more exclusive networks pay less when
prescriptions are filled at in-network pharmacies.171 Although
exact cost savings depend on both the specific prescription
drugs covered by the clients’ drug plan and the pharmacies
included in the network, in general, clients choosing the
standard narrow network pay approximately 1% less for
prescription drugs than they would pay if they chose the broad
network offering.172
Moreover, some of Express Scripts’ clients choose an option
that includes a preferred set of pharmacies within a pharmacy
network.173 Under these preferred network plans, covered
individuals can fill prescriptions at any pharmacy within the
network, but they will pay less (through lower co-pays) at the
preferred pharmacies within that network.174 Because the
preferred network is more exclusive than even the narrow
network, Express Scripts’ clients that choose this option save
approximately 4.5% of prescription drug costs compared to
clients that choose only the broadest retail network.175 Table 2
summarizes the average savings that Express Scripts’ clients
achieve for the different network options.176
Table 2: Cost Savings for Various Pharmacy Networks
Offered by Express Scripts
Savings compared to Standard
Broad Network
Standard Broad Network

—

Standard Narrow Network

approximately 1%

Preferred Network Option

approximately 4.5%

Finally, to address concerns that more exclusive networks
reduce consumers’ access to care because they can only visit

cost and quality of specialty drugs, the ability to utilize the information we
obtain about drug utilization patterns and consumer behavior to reduce costs
for our clients and members, and the level of service that we provide.”).
171. Express Scripts, supra note 18.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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specific network pharmacies, I obtained Express Scripts’ data
on the distance between network pharmacies and covered
individuals. The CMS has established access standards that
ensure pharmacy networks have a sufficient number of retail
pharmacies so patients have convenient access to drugs.177 The
CMS has established that “convenient access” implies that
individuals living in an urban area live within two miles of a
network pharmacy, individuals living in a suburban area live
within five miles of a network pharmacy, and individuals living
in a rural area live within fifteen miles of a network
pharmacy.178 The CMS requires that networks provide the
defined convenient access to pharmacies for 90% of their urban
and suburban covered individuals and 70% of their rural
covered individuals.179
Table 3 reports the percentage of individuals covered
under Express Scripts’ standard broad network and standard
narrow network that have convenient access to network
pharmacies, as defined by the CMS.180 Although the narrow
network offers convenient access to slightly less of the covered
population, both of Express Scripts’ networks far exceed the
CMS requirements for convenient access.181 Regardless of
whether they live in urban, suburban, or rural areas, over 98%
of the individuals covered under Express Scripts’ networks
have convenient access to network pharmacies.182

177. See, e.g., Memorandum from Cynthia Tudor, Director, Medicare Drug
Benefit & C&D Data Grp. 1 (Dec. 22, 2010), available at http://www.cms.gov/
Medicare/Prescription-Drug-Coverage/PrescriptionDrugCovContra/
Downloads/HPMSMEMORetailHIAccess.pdf.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See Express Scripts, supra note 18.
181. Compare id. (reporting convenient access to pharmacies for over 98%
of covered individuals in all cases), with Memorandum from Cynthia Tudor,
supra note 177 (requiring convenient access for 90% of urban and suburban
covered individuals and 70% of rural covered individuals).
182. Express Scripts, supra note 18.
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Table 3: Percentage of Covered Individuals
“Convenient Access” to Network Pharmacies

with

Individuals
Living in
Urban Areas

Individuals
Living in
Suburban
Areas

Individuals
Living in Rural
Areas

CMS requirement
for convenient
access

90%

90%

70%

Express Scripts’
Standard Broad
Network

98.9%

99.7%

98.1%

Express Scripts’
Standard Narrow
Network

98.5%

99.6%

98.0%

Thus, data from Express Scripts, the nation’s largest PBM,
reveals that exclusive pharmacy networks operate exactly as
economic theory would predict. Pharmacies compete to be part
of exclusive networks that will bring them more customers by
offering discounts for prescription drugs. As a result, Express
Scripts’ customers that choose more exclusive network options
pay less for the prescription drug costs of their covered
individuals.183 Moreover, concerns about access to care are
largely unfounded: far more individuals covered under Express
Scripts’ networks have convenient access to network
pharmacies than would be required under governmental
standards.184 This result demonstrates how the intense
competition among PBMs for sophisticated clients ensures that
PBMs will offer the accessibility that consumers want in their
pharmacy networks. Thus, well-designed pharmacy networks
can more than satisfy customer convenience and lower the cost
of healthcare.
CONCLUSION
All available evidence suggests that the benefits of
pharmacy networks clearly exceed the costs. Using the

183. See supra notes 170–76 and accompanying text.
184. See supra Table 3.
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principles of economic theory, the conclusions of previous
empirical studies, the determinations of the FTC, and
proprietary data from the largest pharmacy benefit manager in
the United States, I find that pharmacy networks significantly
lower the cost of prescription drugs for drug plans and
consumers. When drug plans have the ability to exclude
pharmacies from their network and steer patients elsewhere,
pharmacies compete aggressively for selective contracts by
offering price discounts for filling prescriptions. In general,
more exclusive networks produce greater competition because
they promise to channel more patients to network pharmacies.
As a result, more exclusive networks generate even steeper
price discounts.
However, because these cost savings come at the expense
of both the pharmacies that must offer price discounts to be
part of exclusive networks and the pharmacies that are
excluded, pharmacy networks are unpopular among retail
pharmacies. As a result, pharmacy representatives have
alleged various harms created by network pharmacies. Their
primary argument is that networks reduce consumers’ access to
care by limiting their choice of pharmacies. Responding to
these arguments, many states and the federal government
have enacted regulations that limit the ability of health
insurers and/or prescription drug plans to contract selectively.
Further, I find that concerns about consumers’ access to
care are largely unfounded. Competition among drug plans and
PBMs compels them to offer the amount of accessibility that
consumers prefer; drug plans and PBMs that did not offer the
desired level of accessibility would lose out in the competitive
market. As a result, the overwhelming majority of consumers
live near retail pharmacies that are included in exclusive
pharmacy networks.
The conclusions of this analysis are critical for
policymakers considering further limitations on selective
contracting in healthcare. Well-designed pharmacy networks
provide customer convenience and lower the cost of prescription
drugs. It would be reckless for states to enact regulations that
would undo these cost savings and increase prescription drug
prices in our current state of ever-increasing healthcare costs.

